received 200,000 donations in three years, and it emphasized that a large OSS project does not need a single large corporate sponsor, so long as it can rely on the large and diverse ecosystem of the OSS community. 1 This makes the management of effective donation programs all the more important to maintain sustainable OSS projects.
Although donations are critical to OSS, very few studies have looked at monetary donations to OSS projects, and even less attention has been given to their effects. The factors that impact donations were investigated through public records of SourceForge, and it was found that the decision to donate was influenced by relational commitment with the OSS platform. 2 Another study identified the composition of the donor groups and the committer group; although small in number, committers donated more than the other groups. 3 Eclipse started its donation program called Friends of Eclipse in December 2007, and the addition of badges started in November 2014 on the Bugzilla issue-tracking system. 4 Currently, donors who contribute US$35 or more qualify for the Friend of Eclipse status for one year and are recognized on Bugzilla with a Friend of Eclipse badge (hereafter called a donation badge).
However, little is known about the impact of donation badges, particularly how badges might benefit the donors. Based on the framework for causal inference, 5 we studied how promptly developers respond to bug reports that offer donation badges versus bug reports without donation badges. The analysis revealed that the donation badges decreased median response time by approximately 2 h. Our findings suggest that the appearance of donation badges has a practical rewarding effect for individual donors. We theorize that this behavior can be viewed as an effective and inexpensive signaling system, whereby developers use technical and social information as signals to evaluate potential contributions. 6 We believe that other OSS organizers can adopt this strategy to manage their developer ecosystems.
Causal Inference in Brief
Causal inference stems from the social sciences and explores cause and effects as its main concern. 7 In econometrics, difference-in-differences (DID) methods are one of the key analytical elements for causal inference. 7 We adopted this element in our analysis, as outlined Figure 1 . DID is used to statistically visualize actual and counterfactual scenarios, thereby enabling a causality analysis. To investigate the effects of a treatment in statistics, one cannot see the results with and without an intervention based on one individual only. DID addresses this problem by comparing two groups, one with the intervention and one without it. Figure 1 shows how DID is used to understand the effect of donation badges by illustrating the response times of two groups before and after the donation badge program was introduced. Donors refer to all contributors who received badges. As shown in Figure 1 , the counterfactual response trend (i.e., dotted line) is the coefficient of the response trend in the control group. Using that counterfactual response trend and response trend in donors (i.e., positive and negative coefficient values), we infer the effect of donation badges. For instance, a negative coefficient value indicates a faster response time, whereas a positive coefficient value indicates a slower response time.
To improve our results, the DID is extended to quantile DID (QDID) to better describe the relationships at the median and in other quantiles. Only the median is discussed in this article because of space limitations. Although half of the reports received responses in one day, the average time is almost two months because of some outliers (i.e., the maximum value is more than four years).
Because DID depends on the common trends assumption, 7 selecting a proper control group is necessary. Matching is a statistical technique whereby, for every member of the donor group, a control member with similar observable characteristics is found, and it is used to reduce selection bias by equating groups. We used propensity score matching because it is a popular matching technique.
Approach
Our analysis was composed of two phases, as shown in Figure 2 . First, we selected two groups of reporters, i.e., a donor group and a control group whose members have not donated (upper panel). Next, we Our findings suggest that the appearance of donation badges has a practical rewarding effect for individual donors.
identified two groups of bug reports in two time periods that were submitted by reporters in the two groups (lower panel). We designed the analysis with these two phases instead of simply preparing two groups of bug reports (with and without donor badges) because the latter approach can cause bias in selecting bug reports from specific reporters.
Step 1: Bug Report Collection From a discussion of proposing donation badges, 4 we speculated that 13 November 2014 can be identified as the date when donation badges were initially implemented. Therefore, we first identified reporters who had submitted at least once in both periods, i.e., two years before and then after the donation badge implementation. We then collected bug reports submitted by the reporters in the period from two years before to two years after the implementation. Next, we removed bug reports whose first response comments were made by the same reporters or bug reports that were assigned to the original reporters. Bug reports whose first responses had not come in three days were removed; this was to exclude forgotten or intentionally postponed (weeks to years for the first responses) bug reports. Furthermore, we analyzed the impact at the hourly unit by focusing on reports that received a response relatively promptly. Consequently, we were left with 60% of reports after the removal.
Step 2: Bug Reporter Metrics
Metrics of bug reporters were used in the propensity score matching (step 5).
The number of months worked in Bugzilla, the number of bug report submissions in the periods before and after implementation, and the number of commits entered in Git repositories were measured for all reporters.
Step 3: Bug Report Metrics Table 1 ) were used in QDID (step 7). In addition to essential variables for DID (donor, period, and badge), possible factors that affect developer response time (in hours) were explored. Several categorical variables were considered: metrics of seven severity levels (trivial to blocker and enhancement) and metrics related to operating systems. It was reported that bugs with higher severity were fixed faster, 8 and the operating systems where bugs were found were reported to influence bug-fixing time. 9 The "component" metric measures the median response time in components. This is because we found that developer response times vary with Table 1 FIGURE 2. An overview of data collection and causal inference analyses. different components. The "community" metric represents the number of contributors in the community of the component. The "time" metric indicates time in months, which was used by Zhao et al. 10 We prepared this metric to consider the impact of time. The "relationship" metric considers the social and personal relationships between reporters and responders. Ortu et al. 12 found that emotional comments could influence fixing time. 11 However, we did not add emotional factors because it was reported that existing sentiment analysis tools are not always applicable to software engineering domains. 13 From these metrics, we selected a subset of metrics based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). Table 1 shows the subsets that derived the minimum AIC value. For a response variable, response time was also measured in hour intervals from the moment a bug was reported to when it received its first response comment.
Metrics of bug reports (shown in

Step 4: Identifying Donors
Donor names, the dates of donations, and the amount of donations were summarized in a donor list. From this information, we could identify the periods of donation badge appearance in bug reports for each donor. When duplicate names but different email addresses appeared in bug reports, we removed them because we could not associate reporters and donor names uniquely. Consequently, 31 donors were identified.
Step 5: Propensity Score Matching
We used the well-known nearestneighbor matching algorithm in propensity score matching. From 957 reporters who had not donated, 31 reporters matched with the 31 donors were identified as a control group.
Step 6: Filtering Bug Reports Bug reports submitted by the 31 donors or 31 members of the control group were used in QDID. As shown in Figure 2 , those bug reports are labeled with two time periods and two groups.
Step 7: QDID Using the collected bug report metrics shown in Table 1 , we performed QDID. We report the results of fifth decile. Why do donation badges cause faster response times? We assume that a donation badge works as a signal, which is a perceivable indicator of hidden technical and social qualities. 6 Donors are more likely to contribute over the long term than to make one-time contributions; furthermore, they are more receptive and willing to help communities. Thus, responders may infer and react to these qualities.
Results and Discussion
Because the median developer response time in 1,822 studied bug reports is 3.5 h, a time decrease of 2 h is not trivial. This could be a practical rewarding effect for individual donors. For the organizers managing a developer ecosystem, donation badges have appeal because of their potential benefits at an inexpensive cost. Because there is no project-specific metric or assumption, we believe that our findings are not limited to the current Eclipse project.
A pplying a framework of causal inference from econometrics, we investigated the causal effect of donation badges on Bugzilla, one of the benefits for donors. We estimated that donation badges decrease median developer response time for bug reports by approximately 2 h. Our findings show that the appearance of donation badges is appealing for both contributors and organizers. Other OSS organizers can adopt this strategy to manage their developer ecosystems.
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